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LAWRENCE KIMMEL 
Eros / Kalon / Agathos: Love, the Beautiful and the Good 
 
 There is a Peanuts cartoon in which Charlie Brown is looking up into the sky and 
he asks, as Schroeder walks up: “Do you ever see things in the clouds?” Schroeder looks 
up and says:  “Yes. I see the topless towers of Ilium; and there is Horatio at the Gates; 
and over there, Odysseus leaving behind the shadow of Achilles in Hades.”  As 
Schroeder walks on, Charlie Brown says as an aside, “And I was going to say „Look at 
the Ducky, and the Bunny” 
 There are different levels of perception and response in aesthetic experience, 
different backgrounds, capacities, and passions of engagement with respect to beauty.  
But the appeal of the beautiful in the lives of every human being and the constructive and 
transformative character of that appeal is undeniable.  If, as Aristotle expressed it, love 
makes the world go round, then at least in the world of human beings, it is beauty that is 
the force of attraction of that movement. 
Two basic intuitions led to the writing of this essay.  The first is a sense that love 
and beauty have a necessary and reciprocal connection in the growth of the individual 
and culture such that as one develops a greater capacity for love so too does the 
perception and scope of beauty increase, and as the capacity for beauty expands, so too 
do the dimensions of love. 
The second intuition is in the form of a correction, one that re-connects the 
cultural integrity of love, beauty, truth, and wisdom.  Modern philosophy typically 
struggles with the problem of the relation between the analytic categories of the beautiful 
and the good, and the further disconnection of these with the true.  We seem to have 
independently divergent and conflicting standards for judging anything, and accordingly 
need to choose exclusive perspectives.  Classical Greek culture modeled a different 
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perspective, insisting on the fundamental integrity of the true, the good, and the beautiful 
such that whatever is beautiful must be good, whatever good must be true.  
Our interest in this essay will be an investigation of beauty in the transformation 
of standards of value.  This requires that we address not simply an aesthetics of beauty—
the sensuous experience common to the judgment that something is beautiful—but a 
poetics of beauty, in the sense that beauty is not merely a passive reflection of 
experience, but an active bringing forth.  Contemporary discussions of beauty in art, if 
the question is addressed at all (artists understandably wearied at the insistence that art be 
“beautiful” in traditional or accepted standards of the time) tend as do other such 
questions, to be technical discussions of style or production.  My approach will be to 
return to a simpler notion of beauty, away from techne and technique, to Sophia and 
wisdom—to the way in which beauty is transformative in the life of a person or culture.   
The standard or generative text on beauty in the philosophical tradition is Plato‟s 
Symposium.  A dialogue of encomiums to love, its design is to track the transformations 
of the soul in the pursuit of the beautiful.  At dramatic and discursive length, the dialogue 
among the participants moves toward an ultimate stage of understanding in which the 
soul gives birth in beauty to what is good.  Beauty, on Plato‟s view, is the focus of the 
valuational transformations of a journey toward wisdom.  The erotic linking of beauty 
and wisdom at the highest reach of human activity is to give birth—not simply as in the 
case of arts, to beautiful objects and thoughts—but to give birth in beauty to the good that 
is within each soul.  The genuinely good life requires continuously creative acts through 
love and wisdom, but the life is good only if it is brought forth in beauty. There is a 
expression at the heart of Navajo culture that fits the case I want to argue:  to walk in 
beauty. 
The classical conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom is sometimes re-
described in the canon of modern philosophy in ways that discounts the essential and 
generative force of love.  So reconfigured, philosophy becomes not the love of wisdom, 
but the logic of knowledge.  In classical Greek thought, love, as desire and the root of 
motion, was first identified as a lack or absence to account for human aspiration to 
wisdom.  That love is essential is recognized by Plato in the central dialogue of the 
Symposium; the focus of development toward wisdom is accounted for not in terms of 
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Logos and knowledge, but of Eros and beauty.  Wisdom in its cultural embodiment must 
arguably include all these essential elements, but Plato clearly has in mind a convergence 
of Beauty and Truth, in the Wisdom that achieves the Eidos of the Good.  In effect, a life 
well lived—the life of wisdom and virtue—requires a love of the beauty of truth.  
Depending on which dialogues seem central to one‟s particular interests, or what 
philosophical issue is being considering at the time, one may get a very different reading 
of the Platonic corpus. The greatest contrasting paradigms, both central to Plato, would 
seem to be the  of the Republic against or in tenuous alignment with the  of 
the Symposium.  The question of whether it is reason or desire that is at the heart of 
philosophical inquiry is perhaps a moot question: both are obviously central to the 
defining conception of “the love of wisdom”.  Whatever the core of method that develops 
in the pursuit of wisdom, however, there is no pursuit without a sustaining desire, and 
that generative idea is the presenting question of the Symposium.  The interest of this 
essay is in the development of desire in beauty, and we will attempt to clarify the 
connection between love of the beautiful and love of the good—love inspired by beauty 
in relation to the love of the good in life.  In this way we track a convergence of the 
aesthetic and the ethical in individual life and human culture celebrated in art. 
 The original intuition of common sense in ordinary discourse that has served 
philosophy since Socrates on both sides of the issue pro and contra is that the perception 
of „good‟ is a rational judgment, a product of measured reflection.  On the other hand the 
perception of beauty, as commonly considered, is the result of an emotional reflex more 
than a reflective or mediated response.  Similarly, while the good is a determination with 
regard to something within, beauty at first blush is a response to something without. 
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The love of the good seemingly requires reflective study and cultural effort, whereas the 
love of the beautiful seems natural and automatic.  But if so, and for that reason the latter, 
the love of the beautiful, is arguably prior in an order of philosophical concern.  Hence 
the present focus on the Symposium. 
 The range of discussion of beauty in Plato‟s many dialogues would require an 
extensive inquiry in its own right and will not concern us here.  It is enough to say that 
there is an uneven if not ambivalent comportment in the dialogues toward beauty; but the 
whole of his effort is clearly committed to extract the essence of beauty from the sensual 
faculties and the physical world, from the vulgar and carnal senses by effecting an 
ascendance through higher forms of love in the appropriation ob Beauty itself into the 
soul. 
 Nietzsche complains that the Socratic demand, which Plato made his own, is that 
nothing can be beautiful or good unless it is rational, or rather an insistence that to be 
beautiful a thing must be good as judged by reason.  But even if this is a final position 
that proves problematic, it obscures the more complex process of development that Plato 
provides in which beauty—the immediate occasion or quality which accounts for the 
human being‟s response to the world of sense—generates a deeper form of attraction that 
leads the soul, on reflection, to what is genuinely good in life.  Keats‟ lyrical affirmation 
in the Ode on a Grecian Urn, that Truth is Beauty, Beauty Truth is a romantic trope 
distanced from philosophical consideration, but there is in classical Greek thought a 
steady conviction that there exists an integral relation among the fundamental values of 
the true, the good and the beautiful.  Each requires a convergence of the others: nothing 
can be good that is not true, nothing beautiful that is not good. There is also a deep and 
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connected belief that the ascendance to this higher and deeper perception into the heart of 
what is essential to human wellbeing is love. Aside from the metaphysics that attends 
Plato‟s analysis, consider the following familiar passage from the Symposium:   
But what if man had eyes to see beauty…pure and clear and unalloyed…and so, 
holding converse with true beauty simple and divine, to have hold of a reality, 
bringing forth and nourishing true virtue…These thing did Diotima say to 
me…that regarding the attainment of this end, human nature will not find a better 
helper that love.  --Symposium 211e 
 
The concluding sense of the dialectical encomiums in the Symposium is that Eros, 
Love, leading to a converse with true Beauty, has hold of a reality that nourishes 
 the truly Good.  It would be hard to find a more complete philosophical statement of the 
connection that we are analyzing between the concepts and deeper reality of love, beauty, 
and goodness: the convergence of the good and the beautiful is effected by Eros.  And so 
beauty, that to which desire and attraction responds, is at the root of the good and so at 
the heart of human culture and to whatever is higher in human aspiration. 
There are four basic distinctions within classical Greek literature that delineate the 
phenomenon of love, to which we will try to articulate commensurate levels and kinds of 
beauty. 
1. Libidos is the primal energy of the living organism, the driving force of life itself; 
a primal manifestation of a lust for existence. 
2. Eros is desire for, and evoked by the other, the primary attractive force in human 
motivation, usually identified with romantic love.  Plato, however, in the 
Symposium uses this concept as the most general and inclusive form at every level 
of human motion and attraction. 
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3. Philein is a measured and thoughtful response of attraction; considered and 
considerate, it establishes a stable reciprocity of attraction, usually identified with 
friendship. 
4. Agape is a form of “selfless” love, of devotion which does not does not respond to 
the imperative of survival, demand requital, or consolidate social relationships. 
The highest development of love, Agape is transcendent and reconciling. 
These common and traditional forms of expression of love can be drawn out in various 
ways in terms of kinds, levels and intensity.  The object of love at the level of Libidos is 
the driving imperative of life itself--in the absence of libido there is no life.  It is then not 
surprising to find that life-energy, motion, and love are in this way linked as essential to 
all existence, including human existence.  At the level of the organism, the most 
elemental manifestation of love tied to the imperative of survival, Libidos brooks no 
obstacle of consequence that would moderate its force.  It does not make sense to speak 
even in pejorative terms of self-love at this level because there is no “self” to be satisfied, 
nothing of motion or motive in the imperative of survival that requires the human 
locution of “self.”  At this level of description an organism is driven by the desire for life, 
and love; “Libidos” is simply an expression of its own energy.  To the degree to which an 
organism as a living creature initially engages the other, it is in terms of a will to prevail 
over whatever would restrict or suppress such expression. 
If we regard these four different kinds of love in terms of human development, 
which is our interest here, the second stage toward fulfillment is Eros, understood in 
terms of attraction rather than compulsion, in which force is displaced by choice.  This 
distinction is partly a matter of perspective, but it also represents a conceptual shift from 
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a natural organism manifesting life energy to a human being responding in specific ways 
to another human being, and in so doing manifesting in itself a sense of lack, and so a 
sense of the autonomous Other, and in the process gaining an identifying sense of self.  
The chief philosophical interest in an analysis of this level of life, as in the Symposium, is 
precisely that the process and problems of desire generate a preliminary if tenuous sense 
of humanity, in contrast to the way that the process and problems of libidinal desire 
generate only an awareness of existence. 
It may be that the “lack” implicit in the movement of erotic attraction is not 
necessarily experienced as that without disaffections of failure or success, but it provides 
the basis, on reflection, for an awareness both of the limits of self in terms of needs and 
capacities for satisfying them, but also a basis for discernment of wants, of aspiration and 
fulfillment.  It is likely for this reason that Plato makes Eros the comprehensive category 
of the Symposium in the encomiums to love that trace its kinds, levels, objects and effects 
through the various dimension of human desire and development.  For Plato this 
movement is from the sensual world of body to the transcendental world of soul, but we 
can, I think, make out this difference in domains without adopting his idealist duplication 
of worlds. Every level of response and every speech in the Symposium is understandable 
as a distinctly human—that is erotic—response, and each level has already a capacity for 
development beyond the libidinal imperative of survival and so figures in the higher 
development of human culture. 
 In a broad reading of the Platonic corpus, Eros, in the Symposium functions in 
contrast to Logos in a creative and balancing tension that accounts for human life and 
culture.  So considered they provide a parallel metaphor to Nietzsche‟s categories of the 
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Dionysian and Apollonian, though clearly betraying a very different cultural bias.  Plato‟s 
analysis of culture centers within the intellectual structure of a formal polity typical of the 
classical Greek age, in contrast to Nietzsche‟s grounding of culture in the whole of 
nature.  Plato‟s rejection of the paradigm of the structure of the polis in favor of a 
republic retained the conviction that human life, both individual and cultural, requires the 
context of fully human community—the root meaning of polis.  Nietzsche‟s consequent 
critique of classical Greek culture placed the vitality of cultural development in the 
emergent and dynamic context of a changing nature.  Arguably, in contrast to Eros as the 
desire of attraction in Plato‟s account, Nietzsche‟s concept of the life force, of the will to 
power, founds human culture in terms not of desire and attraction where beauty is crucial, 
but in terms of libidos—a driving force that seeks to prevail, to overcome the restrictions 
of any stable development of human community. 
 The times are different of course. Socrates, insisting that the unexamined life was 
not worth living, was concerned that human beings lost their lives for thinking too little 
about them; hence “Know thyself” remained the central touchstone of higher culture.  In 
the emergent culture of the 19
th
 century into our own time there has been a decided 
remove from the classical project of sophrosyne, practical wisdom, and a loss of 
confidence in the enlightenment values of universal reason.  A persistent existential strain 
of the modern temper suggests, on the contrary, that human beings may lose their lives 
for thinking too much, not too little about them.  A corollary, though too faintly felt to be 
an effective deterrent, is that the erotic beauty of the spiritual is depleted by the rational 
economics of utility.  Nietzsche‟s romantic and naturalistic rant against the leveling of 
what he called Alexandrian culture and the effects of a spiritless social order is not 
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without a kind of classical precedent.  In Plato‟s balancing of Eros with Logos, and in the 
complementarity of the Republic and the Symposium, he is plainly aware that the spiritual 
health of culture is an erotic as well as a logistical project, and integral to that project is 
beauty. 
 In any event, although the emphasis changes in the evolution of culture and 
intellectual history in accounting for the split of mind/body, self/other, reason/desire, etc. 
the four Greek categories of love are still intact and useful, and beyond the libidinal and 
beginning with the erotic are singular to the development of human culture in their 
relation to beauty. 
 Philein constitutes a further development from the self-satisfying immediacy of 
desire of the erotic; it is a dimension of life that can be and is moderated—as filial or 
fraternal love, friendship.  At this level of attraction there is a clear awareness of the 
reciprocity of human need in the other.  Reciprocity may occur earlier, with or without 
recognition at the erotic level, in that what one desires in a sexual or romantic 
engagement is precisely the desire of the other, however such awareness is not essential 
to erotic attraction, where the beauty of intensity in the feeling is central.  Philein, 
friendship, discovers beauty in a mediated and shared relationship, a stage apart in beauty 
from cathection of an object as a source of immediate gratification that generates a 
nascent sense of social integration of the good and the beautiful. In every case and in 
whatever form, love is an activity in response to a lack, but in the case of Philein, it is 
perceived as mutual, an implicit acknowledgment that life can be fulfilled only through 
and within a community of others.  If erotic love is a desire for the desire of the other, the 
success of which ensures a sense of intimacy, Philein is a desire for the mutual well being 
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of the other which ensures a generative sense of community.  It is a love built on 
recognition of myself in the other that fosters a reciprocity of care and concern.  The 
beauty found here is not in the immediacy of feeling, or in the transformation of self in 
desire, but the enhanced beauty of social acknowledgment 
Agape, the final development of the form of desire, in whatever its variations of 
secular or sacred expression, expands the scope of desire and so the scope of beauty, and 
carries with it the idea of transcendence.  Perhaps the broadest reading of this form of 
desire is that of reconciliation with, and celebration of the whole of existence.  If the 
initial movement of love as Libido is the internal drive of the organism to overcome the 
other, the evolution of desire develops in Eros for the other, through Philein as care and 
concern for the other, then the cultural development of human beings comes full circle in 
a comprehensive love in Agape, paradoxically, that is selfless.  In this last stage of 
development, beauty is discovered in both transcendence of the isolated self, and of the 
mutual isolation of self and others as a form of life.  The beauty of appeal in Agape is 
reconciliation with the wholeness and unity of life.  The individual in such a condition of 
love becomes, in love, one with the whole of existence.  Thus the direction of desire and 
the compass of beauty tends always toward completing the cycle and circle of initiation, 
separation, and reconciliation. 
 As an organism, a creature must contend with and overcome all else; 
developmentally transformed by love, this conflicted individuation is overcome and life 
itself at the level of Agape is reconciled in beauty so renewed.  The familiar journey of 
desire in Plato is an ascendance to a synoptic vision and the form of the good, in which 
one apprehends beauty as it is in itself, that is, no longer individuated in particular things 
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or people.  In a less metaphysically encumbered expression, the phenomenal world 
appears as, and in terms Keats poetic conflation, is made whole in love, in truth, and in 
beauty.  In a different, religious context—for example in Christianity—this ascendance is 
from love of world to love of God; but in either case the accomplishment is the 
fulfillment of the soul, understood as the highest cultural achievement of the human 
being.  Even in Nietzsche‟s deliberately profane account where love is more a 
manifestation of will than desire, there is this same spiritual ascendance, an overcoming 
of both the individual and commonplace in a restoration of cultural life. 
 In all three of these variances, the manifestation of desire in response to beauty 
involves transcendence as well as ascendance.  Although “selfless” means something 
quite different in the work of Plato, Christianity, or Nietzsche, the life of the individual is 
a cultural development, a cycle of completion from a libidinal creature (whether an 
organism whose origin is the sea or whose home prior to a fatal Fall was Eden) in which 
the initial imperative of love is the beauty of life itself.  The perspective I am suggesting 
here is that individuated life, through a cycle of developmental desire, is restored through 
desire to a beauty creatively commensurate with the evolution of Being itself.  This is 
technical and regrettably obtuse: a better way to express the point may that the 
development of human life—that is human being within cultural life—can be recognized 
in the ascendant cycles of desire and transcending stages, through the sequences of 
organism, human creature, individuated person, dividuated community, to a final 
reconciliation of human being with the principle and source of life itself.  The life and 
emergent culture of human beings are generated and transformed through desire toward 
more and more inclusive forms of beauty.  Beauty, which begins as an immediate appeal 
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of perception that separates self from other, becomes an ultimate focus and form of 
reflection, reconciliation, and celebration. 
 Once we have moved beyond the simple, primal imperative of survival built into 
the living organism—Libidos—movement is accounted for differently in degree, and 
arguably in kind.  No longer a driving force within, love becomes an attractive force 
without that accounts for movements of heart and forms of mind.  It is at this generative 
stage that Plato began his account of the requisite journey of human aspiration in 
philosophy, in Diotima‟s relating to Socrates the story of the demi-god Eros, son of Penia 
and Poros—a creature born of poverty and plenty, a creature caught-between, always 
longing for something higher.  It is hardly surprising that this description of Eros is not 
unlike the picture of we have of ourselves as human beings, creatures defined by a culture 
that is the beneficiary of the spiritual force of this lesser god. 
 We can match-up the objects of attraction to levels and kinds of beauty according 
to the development of love from Eros to Agape.  Freed from the imperative of life, love 
develops in response to beauty as we have seen, into a transcendent aesthetic that 
embraces the whole of existence. Although we have identified Libidos as a driving force 
in response to the imperative of life, it is clear that the first erotic attraction to beauty, for 
example in the Symposium’s analysis in terms of judgment, is the attraction of the 
particular person or object.  Plato, typical of the classical Greek sensibility,  is interested 
only in development at this “higher” level of rational consciousness—that is independent 
of the cycles of natural necessity that bind the lower forms of libidinal life.  The concept 
of beauty on this view only arises at the level of Eros.  We can, however, we can easily 
conceive of prior possibilities of the emergence of beauty.  Consider, for example, in Eric 
 13 
Erickson familiar psycho-social stages of development, the first focus of awareness in the 
infant‟s attachment to the mother‟s breast as a source of life and comfort.  It is arguable 
that this context manifests an initial and intimate sense and source of beauty that develops 
and remains a focus of attraction in the history of art in sculpting and painting nudes no 
less than the populist hyping of the female body in contemporary culture.  It is not only 
philosophy but life that begins in wonder, which carries beauty with it in the logic of its 
attraction.  The whole of ensuing culture, from the first spark of desire, is a continuing 
development of a logic of wonder in beauty, the most eloquent expressions of which are 
found in creative modes of variance within religion, science, and art. 
It is common in philosophy to begin an analysis of beauty at the point of 
judgment „That is beautiful.‟  However, beauty seems appropriate to account for the 
quality in anything that attracts and delights even the child who as yet has no sense of 
propositional judgment.  In this sense beauty may cover a broad range of qualities and 
levels of response, but in every case a property in or attributable to something that elicits 
or triggers desire—the response of Eros.  Modern aesthetics has tended to analyze the 
aesthetic response to art as necessarily disinterested, wholly disengaged from erotic 
engagement.  An aesthetic appreciation of the painting of a female nude, for example, 
must be such that there is no desire for the body in question, no prurience in the 
perception of a naked woman.  But both Plato and Freud, for their different reasons, were 
closer to the heart of a continuing albeit transformed Eros in accounting for the extended 
passions of cultural life. 
 It would be useful to engage in more detailed analysis of the dimensions 
and variations of beauty, for example in perceptions of pretty, attractive, striking, 
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fascinating, singular, awesome, unique, etc.  It is also clear that as generic concepts 
neither beauty nor love have definite boundaries.  Love, as we have seen may be usefully 
distinguished in four distinct categories, prior even to more detailed differences among 
wants and needs.  So too, beauty may be discovered in parallel categories that fit the 
level, kind, and intensity of attraction.  In concert with Plato‟s analysis, the surface  
beauty and physical form of youth may be considered within several variations of carnal 
or sexual attraction; the appeal of friendship further develops in response to a different 
level and kind of beauty, in the attraction of sharing—not simply of taking but of giving. 
We can also attribute, with thanks to Plato, parallels in ascendance of love and beauty 
from a response to particular things to more general and inclusive experiences, from 
physical and surface attraction to the deeper spiritual attraction to which the soul—that is 
the whole and fully human person—responds, so that at a consummate level of Agape the 
whole of existence becomes an experience of beauty. 
From the perspective of the creative arts, desire manifests itself at every level of 
expression. One may choose to judge levels of expression in terms of development out of 
primitive expressions of sheer energy in the striving for existence (Libidos), or, in 
negative terms, in the desperate gestures of those losing a sense of existence, for example 
in the graffiti on the tenement walls of the inner city.  The judgment of what is art, much 
less what is good art, always remains tenuous.  We are inclined however, and rightly I 
think, to reserve the expression of beauty in art to some clear form of affirmation, some 
celebration of life beyond that of contingent survival.  But whatever forms art may take 
beyond „erotic‟ expression, that primitive core of desire remains an essential part of the 
expression and attraction—the beauty—of the work, however refined or abstract its form. 
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Whether in a flat surface of monochromatic paint on a canvass, or the surface 
features of a sculpted shape, if we are moved by its expression as art we are drawn into 
the interior life of the piece, into an interior life of desire in ourselves, and into the 
cultural fabric of a shared history.  The fact that beauty is transformative through desire is 
the creative appeal of art, as well as a reason for its continued existence. 
Having said all this about the appeal and imperative of beauty and desire in art 
and life, I will end on less than a positive note about contemporary life and culture:  
When beauty becomes incidental to the cultural life of a people, when art becomes at best 
an afterthought or addendum of leisure, when it becomes a mere commodity of 
investment, a distraction from the tedium of existence, or worse, a medium for primal 
expressions of anger and hatred, then any hope of a higher culture, or a more vital human 
existence is at an end. 
It is the love of beauty, simply, that creates and restores what is good in human 
life, and the gift and grace of the creative arts in giving us access to expressions of that 
love and to that beauty, are finally and integrally, an essential form of the good that we 
cannot do without.  
 
Lawrence Kimmel 
Trinity University  
